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ESSAYS
TWO DECADES OF "ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES":
FROM TAX RATIONALIZATION THROUGH
ALPHABET SOUP TO CONTRACT AS DEITY
Daniel S. Kleinberger'
© 2008 by the author
ABSTRACT
This essay: (i) puts into perspective the past 20 years of develop-
ments in the U.S. law of limited liability companies (LLCs), limited
liability partnerships (LLPs), and limited liability limited
partnerships (LLLPs); (ii) explains how a movement toward tax
rationalization has been transformed into a palace coup aimed at
fiduciary duty (a fundamental tenet of the U.S. law of closely held
businesses); and (iii) criticizes both conceptually and pragmatically
efforts to "kill Cardozo" and worship "freedom of contract."
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, unincorporated business organizations comprised a back-
water in the U.S. law of business associations. Due to unlimited owner
liability, general partnerships were the choice only of the ignorant, those
constrained by regulations, or those who did not know they were making
a choice.2 As for limited partnerships, the Tax Reform Act of 1986' had
1. Professor of Law and Director of the Mitchell Fellows Program, William
Mitchell College of Law; A.B. 1972, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, Yale Law School.
This essay is based on the keynote address delivered by the author at the 21st Century
Commercial Law Forum, Seventh International Symposium, School of Law, Tsinghua
University, Beijing, People's Republic of China (Oct. 21, 2007). As always, Professor
Kleinberger's work depends on the insights and support of Carolyn Sachs, Esq.
2. Alan Bickerstaff, The Limited Partnership Rollup Reform Act of 1993:
Necessary Protection for Limited Partners or Overreaction to the Rollup Phenomena?,
32 BULL. Bus. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 5, 12 (1995).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
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crippled their use as tax shelters, 4 and the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1987' had eliminated "pass through" partnership tax status
for almost all limited partnerships that were publicly traded.6 In U.S.
law schools, introductory courses in "business associations" mentioned
partnerships only in passing, if at all. Rather, the principal dividing line
within such courses was between corporations that were publicly traded
and those that were closely held.
Today, twenty years later, the law of unincorporated business
organizations is the cutting edge of U.S. entity law. Almost everywhere
in the United States, more limited liability companies are formed each
year than are corporations.7 In addition, the limited liability partnership
has resurrected the general partnership as a rational entity choice,8 and
more than twenty states provide for limited liability limited partner-
ships. 9
As for the legal academy, law schools are slowly beginning to re-
cognize that a single, one-semester course in "business organizations" is
not possible. Many schools now offer a supplemental course in Agency,
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, in addition to the tradi-
tional Corporations course. 0 In 2002, in fact, the American Association
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 669 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002),
rev'd en banc on other grounds, 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2003).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(a), 101 Stat. 1330-403 (1987) (enacting I.R.C. §
7704(a)).
6. Id.
7. Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution - The Social Cost of
Academic Neglect, 371 BERKELEY ELEC. PRESS LEGAL SERIES 1, 1 (2004) (citing e-mail
from Prof. Gary Rosin), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
1961 &context=expresso.
8. Daniel S. Kleinberger, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCs: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 7.3 (Aspen 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Kleinberger, Agency, Partnership
and LLCs].
9. Bruce P. Ely et al., State Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies and
Limited Liability Partnerships, SN067 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 207, n.6 (2007).
10. See, e.g., William Mitchell College of Law Fall 2008 Course List,
http://agresso.wmitchell.edu/information/inquiries/courselist.aspx (last visited Jan. 16,
2009); Fordham University School of Law Corporate Law and Securities Regulation
Curriculum Guide, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/reg-2currguidel l.ihtml?id=529 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2009); Harvard Law School Course and Academic Programs,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2008-09 (last visited Jan. 16, 2009);
New York Law School Elective Courses List, http://www.nyls.edu/academics/catalog_
andschedule/alpha list; Stanford Law School Courses Overview, http://www.law.stan
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of Law Schools granted permanent status to a section on Agency,
Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies and Unincorporated Business
Associations. 1
Twenty years ago, the "alphabet" of U.S. business organizations
was principally about S Corporations and C Corporations. Today, we
have "alphabet soup" - not only S Corporations and C Corporations, but
also LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs.
This essay will chart in summary form the developments in the U.S.
law of unincorporated businesses with two goals in mind: first, to pro-
vide for fellow scholars a historical and conceptual context for under-
standing these developments; and second, to reveal a radical - and in my
view disturbing - trend in U.S. law that has come to be seen as an inte-
gral part of the recrudescence of unincorporated business organizations
in the United States.
B. THE HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL STARTING POINT -
THE TAx SHIELD CONUNDRUM 12
Although unincorporated business organizations involve much
more than tax concerns, it is impossible to understand their development
in the law without understanding key elements of the U.S. tax system as
applied to the income of business organizations. That system distin-
guishes fundamentally between the taxation of organizations classified
as partnerships, on the one hand, and the taxation of organizations clas-
sified as corporations, on the other. In most situations, partnership tax
status is preferable because corporate shareholders face "double taxa-
tion" on any dividends they receive. 13 An ordinary "C Corporation"' 14 is
a taxable entity; it pays corporate income tax on any profits it eams.5
Dividends to shareholders are therefore made in "after-tax" dollars.
Nonetheless, dividends are also taxable as received by the share-
ford.edu/program/courses.
11. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 1.
12. This section is derived closely from KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND
LLCs, supra note 8, § 13.1.2.
13. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 210 (6th
ed. 2004).
14. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS 868 (5th ed.
2006) ("[A] C corporation is a corporation that has not elected (or is disqualified from
electing) S corporation status. The taxable income of a C corporation is subject to tax at
the corporate level while dividends continue to be taxed at the shareholder level.").
15. Id.
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holders. 16 Thus, the profits comprising corporate dividends are taxed
twice.
Partners do not suffer double taxation because a partnership is not a
taxable entity. For income tax purposes, partnerships are "pass through"
structures: the entities' profits (whether distributed or not) are allocated
and taxable directly to the partners. 7 Partnership losses also "pass
through" and can serve as deductions on each partner's own tax return. 8
In contrast, the losses of an ordinary corporation stay with the entity and
are useful only if the entity later enjoys a profit. 19 In 1988, the advanta-
ges of partnership tax status were diminished by "owner liability" - i.e.,
to be taxed as a partnership, an entity had to include at least one owner
(almost always a "general partner") who was automatically liable for all
debts of the entity.20 The driving force behind the development and
spread of the limited liability company (and later the LLP and LLLP)
has thus been the desire to solve this "tax-shield conundrum" - i.e., to
create an entity that, as a matter of tax law, is classified as a partnership
with each owner treated as a partner, but whose owners are shielded by
state law from automatic personal liability.2'
Before the advent of the LLC, entrepreneurs could achieve partner-
ship tax status and limit liability exposure by using an ordinary limited
partnership with a corporate general partner. 22 Alternatively, entrepre-
neurs could use an S corporation to obtain a full liability shield while
achieving some of the advantages of partnership tax status 23 or try to
"zero out" the profits of a C corporation. None of these approaches,
however, was fully satisfactory.
16. Id.
17. See John E. Moye, The Law of Business Organizations 64 (5th ed. 1999).
18. Id.
19. See Cynthia L. Shupe, Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability
Partnerships: New Frontiers for Qualified Plans? Who Are the Employees?, SC62
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1153 n.2 (1998).
20. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 103.
21. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 73, 77 (2d ed. 2007).
22. Id.
23. See Moye, supra note 17 at 221-24 (describing the tax implications of S
corporations).
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1. Ordinary Limited Partnerships with a Corporate General Partner
Under the traditional approach, typically a corporation would be
formed for the sole purpose of serving as the general partner of the limi-
ted partnership. However, this approach had a number of disadvantages.
The structure was complex and involved a significant risk of "piercing"
for the corporate general partner (unless that corporation had assets of its
own, thereby diverting capital from use in the limited partnership's
business).2 4 The structure also raised tax classification issues, unless the
corporate general partner had assets of its own. Furthermore, difficult
questions of fiduciary duty arose, pertaining to the officers of the corpo-
rate general partner. As a formal matter, those officers owed duties to
the corporation, but as a practical matter they were managing and typi-
cally controlling the limited partnership. 25 Lastly, before the moderniza-
tion of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 26 , the "control rule"
27 im-
peded power-sharing by limited partners, even when "the deal" could be
made only on that basis.
2. S Corporations
An S corporation provides a full corporate liability shield with
some of the benefits of pass-through tax status.28 Like a partnership, an
S corporation generally pays no tax on its earnings; its profits and losses
are passed through and taxed directly to its shareholders. 29 S corpora-
tions, however, face significant constraints which do not apply to part-
nerships, including: (i) ownership restrictions, both in terms of the num-
24. J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the
Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97,
103 n.26 (2000).
25. In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 322 B.R. 509, 517, 530 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005).
26. Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303 (2007) (eliminating the "control rule").
27. Id. § 7; see Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has
the Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly Resurrected Limited Partner Estoppel
Liability as Well as Full General Partner Liability, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 667, 669
(2004) (defining "control rule" as a rule making a "limited partner personally liable for
the obligations of the partnership if, like a general partner, the limited partner took part
in the management and control of the partnership's affairs").
28. See Stanley L. Blend, Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue
Act of 1987 on Choice of Entity, 309 Practising L. Inst. Real Est. L. & Prac. Handbook
Series 337, 344, 371 (1988).
29. See Moye, supra note 17, at 221-24.
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ber and character of owners (i.e., excluding most institutional and
foreign investors);30 (ii) the "one class of stock" requirement, which
restricts the type of debt the corporation may issue, hampers efforts to
gradually shift control of family-owned businesses, and generally makes
passive investment very difficult to structure;3" and (iii) preclusions of a
long list of business types and structures.32
3. C Corporations and "Zeroing Out"
A corporation that cannot - or chooses not to - elect S status can try
to avoid double taxation by "zeroing out." To "zero out," the C corpora-
tion makes ostensibly deductible payments to shareholder-employees,
thereby reducing or eliminating corporate profits.33 Such payments can
be made in a number of ways, the simplest being in salaries and
bonuses.
This approach is not risk-free, however. The Internal Revenue
Service may view the payments as disguised dividends, especially
where: (i) the payments are excessive compared with the value of the
services rendered to the corporation, (ii) the payments are proportional
to the shareholders equity interests, or (iii) capital is a material income-
producing factor for the business and the corporation is not paying
reasonable dividends.3 4 Even when successful, zeroing out techniques




33. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. Morton A. Harris, Professional Service Organizations in the 1990's, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 535, 579-580 (1991).
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C. INVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN (U.S.) LLC
35
1. Wyoming Starts a Revolution
Wyoming started the LLC revolution by taking seriously the
Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) "Kintner" Regulations3 6 on tax classi-
fication. Before January 1, 1997, the Kintner Regulations stated the
rules for classifying unincorporated business organizations, and the rules
were biased toward finding partnership status.37 The regulations iden-
tified six key corporate characteristics - among them limited liability,
continuity of life, free transferability of ownership interests, and cen-
tralized management - and classified an unincorporated organization as
a corporation only if the organization had more corporate characteristics
than non-corporate characteristics.38 Thus, although limited liability
may seem to be the hallmark corporate characteristic, the Kintner Regu-
lations contained no "super" factor. Each characteristic was equally sig-
nificant.
In 1977, the Wyoming legislature sought to exploit this "equal
significance" aspect of the Kintner Regulations in order to resolve the
"tax-shield conundrum." The Wyoming LLC Act 39 provided for a new
form of business organization with a full, corporate-like liability shield
but partnership-like characteristics as to entity management, continuity
of life, and transferability of ownership interests. Like a general partner-
ship, a Wyoming LLC was managed by its owners.40 Like a limited
partnership, it risked dissolution if one of its owners ceased to be an
35. The name "limited liability company" appears in the jurisprudence of other
nations, but that fact is a mere linguistic coincidence. "[E]xcept perhaps as to name,
foreign LLCs are not antecedents to U.S. LLCs." CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAx AND BusINEss LAW 1.01[4][a]
(Warren Gorham & Lamont/RIA 1994 & Supp. 2007-2) [hereinafter BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES]. Also, it is possible to find scattered
references to limited liability companies in 19th century U.S. jurisprudence, "but those
companies have no connection to the modem U.S. phenomenon." Id. 1.0114][b].
36. Daniel S. Kleinberger, "Magnificent Circularity" and the Churkendoose: LLC
Members and Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477, 483-84 (1997).
37. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (2008).
38. Id. § 301.7701-2.
39. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-
107(a)(viii)-(ix), 17-15-113, 17-15-122 (1977).
40. Id. § 17-15-116.
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owner." As with any partnership, Wyoming LLC ownership interests
were not freely transferable; absent a contrary agreement, an LLC mem-
ber had the right to transfer only the economic aspect of the ownership
* 41interest. 2 If the Kintner Regulations meant what they said, then a
Wyoming LLC would be accorded partnership tax status.
2. IRS Response to Wyoming; Common Characteristics of Early LLCs
The IRS took over ten years to acknowledge the consequences of its
own tax classification regulations. Revenue Procedure 88-76 classified
a Wyoming LLC as a partnership,43 causing legislatures around the
country to consider seriously the LLC phenomenon. For the most part,
Wyoming's early emulators were faithful copiers, imposing through
their LLC statutes the same basic structure as ordained in the Wyoming
statute. 4 The one major innovation was to establish an alternative gov-
ernance template for manager-management (modeled on the limited
partnership structure), while continuing to set the "default mode" as
member-management. 45
Fidelity to the Wyoming model gave the earliest LLCs some com-
mon characteristics - at least to the extent that they followed the default
blueprint of their respective LLC statutes. An LLC that left in place the
statutory "default" rules was managed by its members in their capacity
as members and was threatened with dissolution each time a member
dissociated. Members had the right to freely transfer the economic
rights associated with membership, but could transfer their membership
interest (or any management rights associated with membership) without
the consent of all the other members. These characteristics meant res-
pectively that the LLC: lacked centralized management (like a general
partnership) 46 ; lacked continuity of life (like a limited partnership with
41. Id. § 17-15-123.
42. Id. § 17-15-122.
43. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
44. Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 102-
103 (1995) (describing the trend by the different states in adopting the Wyoming LLC
model exactly in the beginning).
45. See Susan Price Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for
Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REv. 721, 733 (1989).
46. Catherine M. Rodgers, Business Organizations - Staying Afloat with a Hole in
the Wyoming LLC Act: Default Rules in a Contractual LLC World, 5 WYO. L. REv. 351,
359-60 (2004); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)-(c), (e) (2008).
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respect to the dissociation of any general partner)4 7 ; and lacked free
transferability of interests (like both a general and limited partnership) 48 .
In two senses, therefore, the LLC was a hybrid entity. First, it com-
bined the liability shield of a corporation with the federal tax classifica-
tion of a partnership. 49 Second, it housed a partnership-like capital struc-
ture and governance rules within a corporate liability shield.5 °
3. Increasing Flexibili of Form; IRS Bias Toward
Manager-Managed LLCs
This characteristic picture began to lose focus in 1989 as the IRS
began to loosen its approach to tax classification. In a series of public
and private rulings, the IRS allowed for increasing flexibility of form,
especially as to the continuity of life characteristic. 5 This characteristic
had done much to keep a "family resemblance" among LLCs because,
until 1989, every LLC "blessed" by the IRS had lacked that character-
istic. Beginning in 1989, however, the IRS began to accept both: (i) a
shrinking of the categories of member dissociation that threatened
dissolution, and (ii) a decrease in the quantum of member consent
necessary to avoid dissolution following member dissociation.52 As a
result, LLC organizers had a greater variety of structures from which to
choose.
At the same time, however, the IRS's pronouncements on continu-
ity of life and free transferability of interests were conducing toward a
new characteristic LLC structure. Beginning with Private Letter Ruling
9210019, the IRS revealed a bias toward manager-managed LLCs.53 In
contrast to a member-managed LLC, a manager-managed LLC could
achieve partnership tax status while enjoying significant protection from
business disruption and considerable control over member exit rights.54
Thus, in both official and unofficial ways, the IRS suggested that, for
47. Rodgers, supra note 46, at 359-60.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id at 357-58.
51. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-007 (Sept. 8, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010
(Sept. 15, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-22-052 (June 2, 1989).
52. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-007 (Sept. 8, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010
(Sept. 15, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-22-052 (June 2, 1989).
53. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991).
54. See id.
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purposes of tax classification, LLCs were properly analogized to limited
partnerships rather than to general partnerships.
In 1994, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 95-1055 and made its
earlier suggestion a matter of policy. Revenue Procedure 95-10 purport-
ed to provide guidelines for LLCs seeking advance assurance of partner-
ship tax status under the Kintner Regulations. In reality, however, these
guidelines provided a series of safe harbors that rested heavily on the
limited partnership analogy.
4. "Check-the-Box" and the End to Family Resemblance
Revenue Procedure 95-10 might well have pushed LLCs into the
limited partnership mold if the IRS had not subsequently decided to do
away with the Kintner Regulations entirely. Effective January 1, 1997,
the Treasury Department adopted a "check-the-box" tax classification
regime under which, in general, a business organization organized under
a corporate or joint stock statute is taxed as a corporation. Any other
business organization formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction - is
taxed as a partnership if it has two or more owners, or is disregarded for
income tax purposes if it has one owner - unless it elects to be taxed as a
corporation by "checking the box".
56
"Check-the-box" severed the connection between tax classification
and organizational structure, inviting entrepreneurs (and their attorneys)
to specially tailor the structure of an LLC as each "deal" might require.
"Check-the-box" also resulted in widespread changes to LLC statutes, as
states moved quickly to take advantage of the newly permitted flexibi-
lity. These changes included: (i) eliminating the requirement that an
LLC have at least two members (like a general or limited partnership)
and authorizing one-member LLCs; (ii) authorizing operating agree-
ments in one-member LLCs; (iii) allowing LLCs to have perpetual exist-
ence; (iv) changing the default rule on member dissociation to make
dissociation more difficult, either by depriving members of the power to
dissociate, or by freezing in the economic interest of dissociated mem-
bers; and (v) changing the default rule on the relationship between
member dissociation and entity dissolution, either by providing that
55. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501.
56. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18,
1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301); see also REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 301(a) cmt. (2006) ("[F]lexibility of management structure is a hallmark of the
limited liability company.").
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member dissociation does not even threaten dissolution, or by changing
the quantum of consent necessary to avoid dissolution following a mem-
ber's dissociation.57
D. THE COPYCATS - LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
The advent of limited liability companies had a ripple effect on the
law of general and limited partnerships. Put more simply: if a limited
liability company could shield its owners from automatic, vicarious
liability for the enterprise's debts and still be taxed as a partnership, why
not provide a comparable liability shield for general partnerships? Once
the IRS acknowledged that its Kintner Regulations meant what they
said, there was nothing in tax law to deter state legislatures from
providing for both limited liability general partnerships - LLPs - and
limited liability limited partnerships - LLLPs.
There remained non-tax forces of inertia, however. Most import-
antly, from a non-tax and historical perspective, a general partner's
liability seemed inherently and inescapably the hallmark of partnership
law. It took five years after the IRS's seminal ruling on LLCs for any
state legislature to authorize limited liability partnerships. Moreover, the
first LLP shield was decidedly inferior to an LLC or corporate shield; it
protected against owner liability only if the underlying entity debt arose
in tort, not in contract.58
Today, however, the limited liability partnership is firmly estab-
lished and widespread, and the limited liability limited partnership is
only a few steps behind. All states authorize limited liability partner-
ships, and a plurality of LLP statutes now provide liability shields that
are essentially indistinguishable from an LLC or corporate shield.
Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) - now the law in
seventeen states59 - a limited partnership can originate as or become an
57. States did not, however, change the default rules on transferability of
ownership interests. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,
supra note 35, 1.08, 8.06[1][a].
58. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, § 3.6.2.1, at 76 (2d ed. 2007).
59. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 583, 619 n.170 (2004). These states include
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
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LLLP simply by including a one-line statement in the certificate of
limited partnership.6 o
A limited liability partnership is a general partnership that has
invoked the LLP provisions of its governing general partnership statute
by filing with a specified public official a specified document (typically
called "a statement of qualification" or a "registration"). The entity
thereby becomes a limited liability [general] partnership and eliminates
partially or completely the automatic personal liability of each partner
for each partnership obligation. 6' A limited liability limited partnership,
on the other hand, is a limited partnership that has invoked the limited
liability limited partnership provisions of its state partnership law by
filing with a specified public official a specified document, and thereby
becoming a limited liability limited partnership and eliminating com-
pletely the automatic personal liability of each general partner for each
partnership obligation and, under most statutes, also eliminating the
"control rule" liability exposure for all limited partners.62
E. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
1. Dominance of LLCs
As of 2007, in the U.S. world of non-publicly traded entities, unin-
corporated business organizations predominate over corporations, and
limited liability companies dominate the world of unincorporated busi-
ness organizations.
For example, an annual report from the International Association of
Corporate Administrators reported the following data on entities formed
in 2006:
Virginia. The Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About
the... Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniform
actfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
60. Uniform Limited Partnership Act, iii (2001) ("Instead, the Act makes LLLP
status available through a simple statement in the certificate of limited partnership.").
Section 102(9) states that a limited liability limited partnership's certificate "states that
the limited partnership is a limited liability partnership." Id. § 102(9).
61. CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 13, at 844; Daniel S. Kleinberger, Agency, Partner-
ships, and LLCs, § 7.3, at 227 (3d ed. 2008).
62. CHOPER, ET AL., supra note 13, at 845.
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Table 163
State Business LLCs LLPs Limited LLLPs
Corporations Partnerships
Arizona 12,366 48,345 188 699 253
California 96,278 61,911 419 4,033 n/a
Delaware 33,449 97,508 114 9,901 139
Florida 157,310 123,055 492 1,543 see note
A
New Jersey 18,819 52,344 483 301 n/a
New York 76,474 48,451 319 560 n/a
Oregon 8,243 22,629 85 214 n/a
Texas 36,473 58,288 5,310 16,355 n/a
Washington 12,524 30,457 121 300 n/a
A Figure for limited partnerships includes LLLPs.
Even in states in which new corporate formations still outnumber
LLC formations, the trend is toward LLCs:
Table 2 64
State Corporate Corporate LLC LLC
Formations Formations Formations Formations
2005 2006 2005 2006
California 97,432 96,278 59,431 61,911
Florida 168,182 157,310 123,437 123,055
New York 76,999 76,474 48,564 48,451
Ironically, as the limited liability company has increased in promi-
nence, LLC law has become increasingly subject to corporate concepts
and legal doctrines.6 5 Some have criticized this influence as "conceptual
miscegenation" - a "corpufuscation" foreign to "the practice, philosophy
and law of partnerships" that engendered the LLC.6 6
63. INT'L Ass'N OF COMMERCIAL ADM'RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JURISDICTIONS
(2007), http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2007_IACAAR.pdf (last
visited Jan. 16, 2009).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., In re Mooney, Bankruptcy No. 05-13392-JMD, Adversary No. 05-
1205-JMD, 2007 WL 2403774, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.H. Aug. 17, 2007) (assuming that
Massachusetts courts would apply to LLCs the same rules as for corporations with
regard to managers' duties to creditors and the doctrine of piercing the veil).
66. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-
Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 868-75 (2005) [hereinafter
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At least in some respects, however, the extrapolation from corpo-
rate to LLC law is proper and even inevitable. For example, the doctrine
of piercing the veil originated in the corporate sphere but depends on
two more general concepts: limited liability for an organizations' owner
and a legal identity for the organization separate from the legal identities
of its owners. 67 These twin concepts apply as much to limited liability
companies as they do to corporations; it would be neither efficient nor
logical to re-invent the wheel.
Another major area of overlap concerns the rights of minority
owners. Over the past fifty years, the U.S. law of close corporations has
evolved to recognize that dangers of "oppression" or "unfairly preju-
dicial" conduct exist when: (i) a minority shareholder is subject to the
will of the majority shareholder, and (ii) market limitations or stock
transfer restrictions combine to effect a "lock in" preventing the minor-
ity shareholder from "voting with his feet."
' 68
Comparable dangers exist within limited liability companies, where
transfer restrictions are built into LLC statutes and most LLCs, like cor-
porations, have perpetual existence. Predictably, courts have begun to
analogize LLCs to close corporations and provide remedies for oppres-
69sion.
Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business]; Daniel S. Kleinberger, Progress Report on
the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ('ULLCA H') and the Issue of
'Corpufuscation', XXIII PUBOGRAM 7 (March 2006) (Committee on Partnerships and
Unincorporated Business Organizations of the ABA Business Law Section), available
at http://abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL590000/newsletter/20060320000000.pdf.
67. Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335-36 (D. Utah 1997);
Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, L.L.C., 768 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. Ct. App. 2000). See
generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35,
6.03.
68. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? - The Foibles of Fairness in
Closely Held Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1143, 1148-49 (1990)
[hereinafter Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?]; see John H. Matheson & R. Kevin
Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the Closely Held
Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 665-76 (2007) (defining and giving a historical
overview of "oppression"); Sandra K. Miller, et. al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited
Liability Companies: Assessing the Need to Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. Bus.
L.J. 609, 613 (2006); Keith Rogers, Comment, Protecting Minority Shareholders in
Alaska Close Corporations, 24 ALASKA L. REv. 45 (2007).
69. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of
Limited Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 63, 120-25 (2006) [hereinafter
Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative]; Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on
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The parallel has begun to appear in statutes as well. For example,
while the newest Uniform Limited Partnership Act allows a court to
decree dissolution only when "it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
the activities of the limited partnership in conformity with the partner-
ship agreement, ' ' 70 the new Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act also permits judicial dissolution "on application by a
member . . . on the grounds that the managers or those members in
control of the company ... have acted or are acting in a manner that is
oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant."
7'
2. The Ouestion of "Corpufuscation" and the Influence of Delaware
The "corpufuscation" issue has roiled the water around the ques-
tion of a "shelf' LLC - "i.e., an LLC formed without having at least one
member upon formation." 72 When the Uniform Laws Conference was
working on the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("Re-
ULLCA"), "[n]o topic received more attention or generated more debate
in the drafting process .... Reasonable minds differed (occasionally
intensely) as to whether the 'shelf approach (i) is necessary to accom-
modate current business practices; and (ii) somehow does conceptual vi-
olence to the partnership antecedents of the limited liability company."
7 3
Re-ULLCA solved the problem (perhaps temporarily) with a com-
promise,74 but a recent federal court decision concerning the Delaware
LLC Act may have mooted the debate.75 In deciding an important point
Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1612 (2004);
Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company: Learning
(or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 926, 956-57
(2005).
70. Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 802 (2001).
71. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act §§ 701(a)(5)(B), 701(b)
(2006) (permitting a court to decree a less or different remedy, e.g., a buy-out of the
applicant); see also, Michigan Limited Liability Company Act § 515(1) (2008)
(codified at MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4515(1) (West 2008)) (providing a judicial
remedy for a member when, inter alia, the "acts of the managers or members in control
of the limited liability company ... constitute willfully unfair and oppressive conduct
toward the limited liability company or the member").
72. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 201, cmt. (2006).
73. Id.
74. Id. (describing a two-filing mechanism that provides some of the benefits of a
shelf LLC without actually authorizing that approach).
75. See ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 482 F. Supp. 2d 3, 19 (D. Mass. 2007).
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of federal jurisdiction, the court noted that "no one became a member at
the formation of the LLC" and held that "[t]his is perfectly acceptable
under Delaware law and does not in any manner implicate the validity of
the LLC. '76
An opinion on the Delaware LLC Act has magnified importance
because "the Delaware law seems to exert an almost gravitational pull"
on LLC practice and jurisprudence. 7  Delaware preeminence in the
world of publicly traded corporations is well known,7 8 and ever since
the IRS accepted the LLC phenomenon, Delaware practitioners,
legislators and judges have striven to achieve the same preeminence
with LLCs.
The core advantage for Delaware is its vaunted Court of Chancery,
a business court without peer in the United States, and its state Supreme
Court, many of whose justices first served in the Court of Chancery.79
Another part of Delaware's pull has been its approach to the overlap of
contract and fiduciary duty. That approach is part of a larger debate and,
in my view, the developments discussed above in LLC law in general,
and Delaware LLC law in particular, have provided a "sleight of hand"
with disturbing consequences.
F. CONTRACT AS DEITY AND THE DEATH OF CARDOZO
It has been hornbook law for centuries that a partnership inherently
and inescapably involves fiduciary duties among the partners.80 Until
76. Id. at 20-21.
77. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35,
14.01[2].
78. See Triumph of the Pygmy State; American Business and the Law, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 23, 2003.
79. Delaware State Courts, First State Judiciary, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Supreme%20Court/?justices.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (stating that three of the
current five Delaware Supreme Court justices, including the chief justice, first served
on the Delaware Court of Chancery).
80. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 172, 174-81
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1980) (1841) ("The necessity of entire good faith, and of
the absence of fraud on the part of partners towards each other, is inculcated by Cicero
in terms of deep import and sound morality.") [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP]. Sections 174 through 181 catalogue various aspects of
what Story terms "good faith" and what in modem parlance is called "the duty of
loyalty." See also Nathaniel Lindley, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING ITS
APPLICATION TO JOINT-STOCK AND OTHER COMPANIES 412 (T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO.)
(1860) ("The utmost good faith is due from every member of a partnership towards
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quite recently, fiduciary duty has been the unquestioned lodestar of
partnership law in the United States. Justice Cardozo's pronouncement
in Meinhard v. Salmon was once unquestionably emblematic:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. 
81
Cardozo's seminal view was questioned in the early 1990s during a
Uniform Laws 82 project to revise the then 80-year-old general Uniform
Partnership Act ("UPA").8 3 The revision process fueled a debate over
whether the partnership agreement should have the power to annul fidu-
ciary duties. So-called "contractarians" argued that fiduciary duties
were merely default rules, completely subject to revision - or even
elimination - by agreement. 84 Traditionalists defended fiduciary duty as
a core value not only for society generally but also within business
enterprises.8 5 Eventually, in 2007, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
every other member... [and] conduct [that] will bear to be tried by the highest standard
of honor.").
81. 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (N.Y. 1928).
82. The Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws Homepage,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
83. The Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Partnership
Act (1994), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-summaries/uniform
acts-s-upa1994.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
84. Michael Haynes, Comment, Partners Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest
Loyalty ... Or Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which Partners May Limit Their
Duty of Loyalty to One Another, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 433, 449 (2005); Mark J.
Lowenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the
"Manifestly Unreasonable" Standard, 41 TULSA L. REv. 411, 414 (2006); Larry E.
Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209, 236 (2005).
85. J. William Callison, "The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend.": The
Inadequacy of the Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business
Organizations, 94 Ky. L.J. 451, 485 (2005); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in
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("Re-UPA") sided with tradition, while nonetheless making clear that
the partnership agreement had great powers to regulate the partners'
relation inter se. 
86
The advent of limited liability companies created a forum to renew
the contractarian-fiduciary duty debate. From its very inception, the
Delaware LLC Act has proclaimed: "It is the policy of this chapter to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements." 87  More
specifically, as originally enacted the Delaware LLC Act also provided
that:
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager has
duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to a
limited liability company or to another member or manager ... the
member's or manager's duties and liabilities may be expanded or
restricted by provisions in a limited liability company agreement. 88
By itself this language was interesting but not radical. 89 However,
dicta in some decisions of the Delaware Chancery Court suggested that
the power to restrict might encompass the power to eliminate fiduciary
duties entirely. 90 In 2002, in Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty
Partners, L.P., the Delaware Supreme Court engaged in some "counter-
dicta" and announced that the power to restrict did not include the power
to eliminate. 91
Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on
Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1621 (2004).
86. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 103 (2007).
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(c) (1992).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 18-1101(c) (2000) (expanding this language to include "an other person
that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement").
90. See, e.g., Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. Ch. 1998)
("[c]onsidering § 17-1101(d) of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act's apparently broad license to enhance, reform, or even eliminate fiduciary duty
protections"); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., No. CIV. A.
15754, 2000 WL 1476663, at *13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2000) (stating that section 17-
1101(d)(2) "expressly authorizes the elimination, modification, or enhancement of...
fiduciary duties in the written agreement governing the limited partnership"), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded, 817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002).
91. See Gotham Partners, 817 A.2d at 167-68.; Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v.
Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (concerning a Delaware limited partnership,
where "[t]he Delaware Act has been modeled on the popular Delaware LP Act. In fact,
its architecture and much of its wording is almost identical to that of the Delaware LP
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But the Delaware legislature soon overruled the Delaware Supreme
Court. Statutory amendments enacted in 2004 expressly provided that
an LLC agreement may eliminate fiduciary duties. 92  Now, the
American Bar Association's Committee on Limited Liability
Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Entities 93 is
considering whether a "model" LLC act should follow the Delaware
approach. 
94
The ABA model act is in its early phases and the more or less ad
hoc group of attorneys who make up the drafting subcommittee includes
both individuals strongly opposed to the "eliminate" approach and indi-
viduals who favor the approach.95 Meanwhile, the chief justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court has embraced the "eliminate" approach as be-
ing the proper course for the law of unincorporated business organiza-
tions. In a law review article published in 2007, Chief Justice Myron
Steele stated that "Delaware courts need to be mindful of the distinction
between status relationships and contractual relationships." 96  In addi-
tion, he urged that we:
Act") (footnotes omitted); BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES,
supra note 35, 14.05[4][a][i] (coining the term "counter-dicta").
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101 (c) (2004). To the extent that, at law or in
equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a
limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is
a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the
member's, manager's or other person's duties may be expanded, restricted or eliminated
by provisions in the limited liability company agreement, provided that the limited
liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
93. Formerly called the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business
Organizations, the Committee is part of the ABA Business Law Section. The older
ABA Prototype Act empowered the operating agreement to exculpatory provisions.
94. Prototype Limited Liability Co. Act § 402 (1992) (defining duties as avoiding
"gross negligence or willful misconduct").
95. American Bar Association, Section of Business Law: Partnerships and
Unincorporated Business Organizations: Model Limited Liability Company Act,
available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL590005pub/materials.shtml. The
disposition of the committee members as to contractual elimination of fiduciary duties
is asserted by the author and is not official.
96. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 9 (2007).
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[C]ome to grips with the reality that the contractual relationship
between parties to limited partnership and limited liability company
agreements should be the analytical focus for resolving governance
disputes-not the status relationship of the parties. When the parties
specify duties and liabilities in their agreement, the courts should
resist the temptation to superimpose upon those contractual duties
common law fiduciary duty principles .... 97
Chief Justice Steele criticized the Gotham Partners decision for its
"singular focus on status relationships" and for "treating the parties to all
limited partnership or limited liability company agreements as having a
dependency relationship (e.g., a trustee to beneficiary or agent to
principal), rather than a contractual relationship...." 98 Moreover, Chief
Justice Steele disparaged the Gotham Partners court for "its nostalgia
for the familiar, and inability to escape the lure of the common law" 99
and for importing into the pristine world of contractual relationships
status-related fiduciary duties "analogized from the law of corporate
governance."' 00
Chief Justice Steele's remarks illustrate the contractarian's "sleight
of hand" with regard to fiduciary duty. While for some purposes the
limited liability company is seen as a form of partnership, 1° 1 that con-
nection (and the historical antecedents) disappear when fiduciary duty is
at issue. In that context, the LLC is characterized as purely a creature of
contract. Moreover, to further "re-frame" the debate, the lodestar role
for fiduciary duty is linked to corporate, rather than partnership law.
But Meinhard v. Salmon was not a corporate case. Rather, it in-
volved joint adventurers (essentially partners for a particular under-
taking) arguing over a lacuna in their agreement. Moreover, "status
relationship" and "contract" are not dichotomous concepts. Status rela-
tionships often arise by or in connection with a contract, and the creative
tension between agreement and fiduciary duty within closely held busi-
nesses dates back at least to the formation of the United States and most
likely before. 10 2 In the twentieth century, the law of corporations ap-
proached close corporations as "incorporated partnerships" in order to
97. Id. at 25.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. at 25.
101. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35,
5.04[2][d][i], 8.06[l].
102. See Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, supra note 80, § 169-215.
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establish shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties and to validate
shareholder contracts displacing the standard corporate governance
structure.' 03
G. A WARNING AGAINST THE NOTION OF CONTRACT AS DEITY
It is wrong to treat limited liability companies as involving a
unique relationship between contract and fiduciary duty. To do so both
ignores the place of limited liability companies in the history of unin-
corporated business organizations and misunderstands the general rela-
tionship between contract and fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty attaches to
particular contractual relationships for the same basic reason applicable
in other contexts - to proscribe and constrain abuses of power. 104 Abuse
of power is no less a threat under operating agreements than under
partnership agreements. Indeed, the "lock in" problem is substantially
greater under a modern LLC statute than in a general partnership
organized under the original Uniform Partnership Act. 1
05
The problem is not merely historical and conceptual. The follow-
ing five points explain the substantial practical risks involved in killing
off Cardozo and turning contract into deity:
1. The Permissible Will Become Standard
In the long run, permitting contracts to annul fiduciary duty will be
tantamount to annulling fiduciary duty essentially whenever a control-
ling owner is involved in a business. Fiduciary duty burdens those with
power; controlling owners will naturally seek to avoid those burdens
103. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 302 (1999); Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?,
supra note 68, at 1152-53; Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs.
Derivative, Or "What's a Lawsuit Between Friends in an 'Unincorporated
Partnership?"', 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1203, 1268 (1996); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will in the Close Corporation: The
Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 517, 528-29 (1999); Model Business
Corporation Act § 7.32 (2003) (demonstrating that most state corporate laws now
directly authorize shareholder control agreements).
104. Carter G. Bishop, Discussions on Fiduciary Duty and Capital Lock-In: A Good
Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 TULSA L.
REv. 477, 510-11 (2006).
105. See Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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when they have both the legal mandate and the negotiating power to do
so.
2. Radical Change Brings Unintended Consequences
Law reformers, being human, have imperfect predictive powers.
The more fundamental a proposed change, the greater the risk of unin-
tended consequences. As both a practical and ethical matter, those pro-
posing a sea change in norms have a heavy burden of demonstrating
why the current sea is so bad. 1
06
For centuries, the Anglo-American system of law and equity has
held that a special relationship inevitably arises, and should arise, when
people join their property and their efforts in a common business enter-
prise. We should not lightly, nor quickly, reject such a long-standing
position.
Consider, for example, the "pick your partner" principle that is at
the core of the law of limited liability companies. 107 That principle rests
on the notion that each co-owner relates to each other in a position of
trust and confidence - i.e., as a fiduciary. If the law begins to see
fiduciary duty as merely a set of contractual default rules, what happens
106. Most advocates for the death of fiduciary duty approach the subject from a
"law and economics" perspective. E.g. Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of
Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 123, 140-45 (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REv. 209, 232-38 (2005). This highly theoretical approach is impossible to prove or
disprove. However, the development of the law of close corporations suggests that, at
least for the overwhelming majority of closely held businesses, fiduciary duty has great
practical importance and appeal. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?, supra note 68, at
1165 (explaining how courts developed fiduciary norms for close corporations to deal
with abuse of power by majority owners); S. Mark Curwin, Comment, Fiduciary Duty
and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Sufficient Protection of Member
Interest?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 989, 1016-18 (1993); Sandra K. Miller, The Role
of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory
Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REv.
1609, 1654 (2004) (arguing that "a broad approach to fiduciary duties is arguably
preferable ... because it better reflects society's norms of ethical conduct, may be more
effective in combating subtle freeze-out schemes, and does not rest on the assumption
that the parties' relationship is governed by a highly negotiated.., contract").
107. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 502 cmt.; see also BISHOP
& KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, 8.06[1][b] n.452
(noting that the dramatic changes in LLC statutes following "check-the-box" did not
affect this aspect of LLC statutes).
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to the conceptual (and historically venerated) notion of delectus
personae?10 8
Consider also, that for at least a century, fiduciary duty has co-
existed with a marketplace economy and a marketplace ideology. In-
deed, "co-exist" may be an understatement. Within closely held busi-
nesses, fiduciary duty may have helped firms function coherently and
thereby compete more effectively. Eliminating fiduciary duty may thus
increase costs and decrease efficiency.
1 09
3. Uprooting Fiduciar Dut Will Have
Direct and Substantial Doctrinal Fallout
Eliminating fiduciary duty will produce serious and direct doctrinal
consequences, particularly with regard to the "strict construction" aspect
of fiduciary law and the remedies available for breach.
When a fiduciary invokes waiver or consent to justify otherwise ob-
jectionable conduct, the law not only requires antecedent full disclosure
but also resolves doubtful cases against that fiduciary. 110 Also, when a
fiduciary attempts to operate within a lacuna in an agreement, the law
strictly scrutinizes that conduct.11' If a contract can eliminate fiduciary
duty, the weaker participant is left with the far less protective device of
contra proferentem. 1
12
As for remedies, the difference between contract claims and breach
of fiduciary duty claims is substantial. Suppose that an operating agree-
ment in a Delaware limited liability company purports to eliminate all
fiduciary duties of the owners and to replace those duties with a contrac-
tual restatement. Does a breach of those stated duties give rise to a fidu-
ciary duty claim or a contract claim?
The answer might be quite significant with regard to remedies.
With a fiduciary duty claim, the plaintiff can seek disgorgement (con-
structive trust) without having to prove damages. 113 But disgorgement
108. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, supra note 80, § 5.
109. Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager
After More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 565, 604 (2007).
110. Id. at 590.
111. Id. at598.
112. This canon of contract interpretation suggests that contractual ambiguities be
construed against the party that controlled the contract drafting process. 11 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 2008).
113. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 900-01 (1988).
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is not typically a contractual remedy.114 In contract, parties are limited
to damages on theories of reliance or expectation, while in some cases
parties are limited to restitution for benefit conferred.
If the claim is "merely" for breach of the operating agreement, from
where would a court get the power to order disgorgement?' 1 5 Perhaps if
the plaintiff could demonstrate that it could not prove damages, the court
might reach into its equity power to find a remedy because there is no
adequate remedy at law. But that situation is a far cry from a plaintiff
having the disgorgement remedy as a matter of right, where the ability to
prove damages is irrelevant.
Suppose the drafters of the operating agreement, foreseeing this
problem, cause the operating agreement to provide contractually for a
disgorgement remedy. Will the law permit this novel type of "agreed
damage" provision? The remedy is equitable in nature, and generally
courts have resisted contractual attempts to mandate equitable relief.
11 6
The Delaware LLC Act purports to answer this question by expressly
authorizing an LLC agreement to provide for "specified penalties or
specified consequences,"' 17 but such authority is at odds with hundreds
of years of contract law.
114. The proposed Restatement (Third) of Restitution (Profit Derived from
Opportunistic Breach) § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 4 2005) might change this part of the
legal landscape. The black letter law is detailed and the comments lengthy, but the
former begins as follows: "If a breach of contract is both material and opportunistic, the
injured promisee has a claim in restitution to the profit realized by the defaulting
promisor as a result of the breach." Id. at § 39(1). However, this proposal is quite
controversial.
115. The situation is different if the agreement purports only to delimit or "sculpt"
the fiduciary duties and either implicitly or explicitly preserves some fiduciary duty.
For a discussion of the complexity of this approach, see Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 166-67 (Del. 2002) ("[T]he Partnership
Agreement supplanted traditional fiduciary duties and provided for contractual fiduciary
duties by which the defendants' conduct would be measured.").
116. See, e.g., Kanan, Corbin, Schupak & Aronow, Inc. v. FD Int'l, Ltd., 797
N.Y.S.2d 883, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (reasoning that because the factors for
determining compensatory damages were known, injuries were not irreparable).
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 18-306, 18-405 (2007).
2009 TWO DECADES OF "ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES" 469
4. The Limited Power of Contractual Good Faith
Although some authorities suggest that contractual good faith is a
judge's roving commission for determining fairness, "18 contractual good
faith is simply no substitute for fiduciary duty.
History suggests that contractual good faith and fiduciary duty are
not functional equivalents; they developed independently to serve differ-
ent values.119 The contractual duty serves principally to constrain be-
havior within arm's length relationships 120 and to apply, in essence, "the
morals of the market place [sic].' 21 Fiduciary duty exists to police rela-
tionships that involve, in Cardozo's eternal words, "the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive." 1
22
The scope and power of the two duties are accordingly quite
different. Properly understood, the contractual duty is ancillary and sub-
servient to the contractual arrangements.123 Its function is to allow the
contract to mean what it says; 124 it is therefore of no use to police mis-
118. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 404 cmt. 4 ("The meaning of
'good faith and fair dealing' is not firmly fixed under present law. 'Good faith' clearly
suggests a subjective element, while 'fair dealing' implies an objective component. It
was decided to leave the terms undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop
their meaning based on the experience of real cases.").
119. Nomenclature in this area can be confusing, because modem U.S. decisions
involving close corporations sometimes use the phrase "utmost good faith" to
encompass fiduciary duties among shareholders. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975).
120. The obligation also inheres in contracts involving a fiduciary, but - given the
applicable fiduciary rules - in that context the contractual obligation may be surplus.
121. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (N.Y. 1928).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., Inc., 750 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Del.
Ch. 2000) ("The implied covenant of good faith requires a party in a contractual
relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of
preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of the contract. This
doctrine emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party. The parties' reasonable expectations at the
time of contract formation determine the reasonableness of the challenged conduct ....
[C]ases invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be rare and
fact- intensive. Only where issues of compelling fairness arise will this Court embrace
good faith and fair dealing and imply terms in an agreement.") (footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted).
124. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) § 305(b) cmt. ("[T]he purpose of
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to protect the arrangement the partners
have chosen for themselves, not to restructure that arrangement under the guise of
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conduct that is outside the contract. 125  Moreover, at least under
Delaware law, a person asserting a good faith claim has the heavy
burden of demonstrating an "issue of compelling fairness."' 126 This bur-
den is in sharp contrast to the "strict construction" approach of fiduciary
law described above.
Delaware's reaction to Gotham Partners supports the assertion that
contractual good faith is less powerful than fiduciary duty. When the
legislature empowered operating agreements to "eliminate" fiduciary
duty, the legislature also carefully preserved from elimination "the
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' 127 Therefore, since
the legislation's evident intent was to empower agreements and "cabin
in" judicial scrutiny, the legislature must have considered the contractual
covenant to be less powerful than fiduciary duty.
In short, to rely on the contractual duty of good faith as a substitute
for fiduciary duty is akin to replacing heavy cream with skim milk. 128
safeguarding it.").
125. See, e.g., In re Wet-Jet Int'l, Inc., 235 B.R. 142, 151 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999)
("A distinction ought ... to be drawn between actions taken by stockholders with
respect to one another, which are explicitly covered by their unfettered agreement to be
bound, and actions taken outside of such an agreement. Such a distinction .... gives
effect to the intention of the parties with regard to the specific terms of their agreement,
and yet leaves the [fiduciary] policies . . . intact by retaining a high level of scrutiny
over dealings that fall outside the terms of the shareholder agreement.").
126. Cont'l Ins. Co., 750 A.2d at 1219, 1234.
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(e), enacted by 2004 Del. Laws, ch. 275 (H.B.
411) § 13. Parallel amendments to the limited and general partnership acts are found in
2004 Del. Laws, ch. 265 (S.B. 273) § 15 and ch. 266 (S.B. 274) § 3, respectively.
128. To the extent the courts try to churn contractual good faith into heavy cream,
the result may be a contractarian's nightmare. Fiduciary duty derives from equity, and
equity jurisprudence contains some useful limitations on plaintiffs (e.g., the "clean
hands" doctrine). If the elimination of fiduciary duty causes courts to distort the duty of
good faith into, for example, a doctrine that protects extra-contractual "reasonable
expectations," we may see the elimination of fiduciary duty produce results like Pooley
v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming buy-out, without any discount, of a shareholder employee who had "pleaded
guilty to assaulting someone in the scope of his employment") and Royals v. Piedmont
Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 515, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (ordering dissolution
in connection with the claim of a shareholder whom "independent counsel ... [had]
concluded ... had committed various acts of sexual harassment").
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5. The Lack of Human Prescience
To break fundamentally with history and uproot fiduciary duty
involves more than just a fundamental break with long-standing rules.
The break also involves a sea of change in: (i) how the law approaches
the risks that inherently exist in people entrusting their property and
sometimes their livelihoods into management by, or co-management
with, others, and (ii) what the law believes possible of contract drafters.
As the author has observed elsewhere:
The open-ended nature of fiduciary duty reflects the law's long-
standing recognition that devious people can smell a loophole a mile
away. For centuries, the law has assumed that (1) power creates
opportunities for abuse and (2) the devious creativity of those in
power may outstrip the prescience of those trying, through ex ante
contract drafting, to constrain that combination of power and
creativity. For an attorney to advise a client that the attorney's
drafting skills are adequate to take the place of centuries of fiduciary
doctrine may be an example of chutzpah or hubris (or both). 1
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CONCLUSION
The limited liability company has revitalized the law of unin-
corporated business organizations and has become the principal vehicle
in the U.S. for housing closely held businesses. The LLC should not,
however, be the vehicle for transforming fiduciary duty into a mere set
of default rules. That transformation would rewrite the brief, modem
history of LLCs and ignore the centuries-long history of U.S. closely
held businesses.
129. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35,
14.05[4][a][ii].
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